Rotate gitea SECRET_KEY into its own claim, drop gitea-random

Completes the post-breach (CVE-2026-59774) secret split. SECRET_KEY moves
from the shared gitea-random claim to a dedicated gitea-secret-key claim
with a fresh value, and the now-unused gitea-random claim is removed
(ArgoCD prunes it).

The earlier concern that rotating SECRET_KEY breaks the 2 push mirrors was
wrong: their gitlab.com credentials live in each repo's on-disk git config,
not in SECRET_KEY-encrypted storage. Blast radius here is negligible: 0 TOTP
2FA, 0 Actions secrets, 0 runner tokens, pull mirrors are public. SECRET_KEY
has no length constraint (Gitea hashes it to derive the AES key), so unlike
JWT_SECRET size 32 is fine and is not regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Erki Aas
2026-09-15 23:01:54 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent e17b0e0b41
commit 910f2c56d0
+9 -15
View File
@@ -16,28 +16,22 @@ spec:
# Gitea DOES NOT go through Traefik. It has its own IP because ssh :22 would conflict with kube worker ssh. On its own IP, at the moment it doesn't flirt with Traefik — also has its own certificate. # Gitea DOES NOT go through Traefik. It has its own IP because ssh :22 would conflict with kube worker ssh. On its own IP, at the moment it doesn't flirt with Traefik — also has its own certificate.
--- ---
# After the 2026-09 breach (CVE-2026-59774) all three secrets below leaked # After the 2026-09 breach (CVE-2026-59774) all three security secrets leaked
# because they shared one generated value. INTERNAL_TOKEN and JWT_SECRET were # because they shared one generated value from a single "gitea-random" claim.
# moved to their own claims (gitea-internal-token, gitea-oauth2-jwt) and rotated; # Each now has its own claim and a fresh value: gitea-secret-key,
# the StatefulSet now reads those two from the new claims, so the copies here are # gitea-internal-token and gitea-oauth2-jwt. The old shared gitea-random claim
# unused. SECRET_KEY is intentionally still sourced from this claim and NOT # was removed. SECRET_KEY has no length constraint (Gitea hashes it to derive the
# rotated: a new value would make data-at-rest (push-mirror creds, 2FA) # AES key), so size 32 is fine; the earlier worry about push mirrors was wrong:
# undecryptable and break the 2 push mirrors, whose credentials must be re-entered # their credentials live in each repo's on-disk git config, not SECRET_KEY.
# by hand. Do not shrink this mapping: the operator would regenerate the plaintext
# and change SECRET_KEY. Rotate SECRET_KEY in a maintenance window instead.
apiVersion: codemowers.cloud/v1beta1 apiVersion: codemowers.cloud/v1beta1
kind: SecretClaim kind: SecretClaim
metadata: metadata:
name: gitea-random name: gitea-secret-key
spec: spec:
size: 32 size: 32
mapping: mapping:
- key: GITEA__SECURITY__SECRET_KEY - key: GITEA__SECURITY__SECRET_KEY
value: "%(plaintext)s" value: "%(plaintext)s"
- key: GITEA__SECURITY__INTERNAL_TOKEN
value: "%(plaintext)s"
- key: GITEA__OAUTH2__JWT_SECRET
value: "%(plaintext)s"
--- ---
apiVersion: codemowers.cloud/v1beta1 apiVersion: codemowers.cloud/v1beta1
kind: SecretClaim kind: SecretClaim
@@ -264,7 +258,7 @@ spec:
- name: GITEA__SECURITY__SECRET_KEY - name: GITEA__SECURITY__SECRET_KEY
valueFrom: valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: secretKeyRef:
name: gitea-random name: gitea-secret-key
key: GITEA__SECURITY__SECRET_KEY key: GITEA__SECURITY__SECRET_KEY
ports: ports:
- containerPort: 8080 - containerPort: 8080