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mirror of https://github.com/laurivosandi/certidude synced 2025-10-30 08:59:13 +00:00

Several updates #3

* Move SessionResource and CertificateAuthorityResource to api/session.py
* Log browser user agent for logins
* Remove static sink from backend, nginx always serves static now
* Don't emit 'attribute-update' event if no attributes were changed
* Better CN extraction from DN during lease update
* Log user who deleted request
* Remove long polling CRL fetch API call and relevant test
* Merge auth decorators ldap_authenticate, kerberos_authenticate, pam_authenticate
* Add 'kerberos subnets' to distinguish authentication method
* Add 'admin subnets' to filter traffic to administrative API calls
* Highlight recent log events
* Links to switch between 2, 3 and 4 column layouts in the dashboard
* Restored certidude client snippets in request dialog
* Various bugfixes, improved log messages
This commit is contained in:
2018-05-04 08:54:55 +00:00
parent 4348458d30
commit bfdd8c4887
22 changed files with 450 additions and 440 deletions

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@@ -1,218 +1,19 @@
# encoding: utf-8
import falcon
import mimetypes
import logging
import os
import hashlib
from datetime import datetime
from xattr import listxattr, getxattr
from certidude.common import cert_to_dn
from certidude.user import User
from certidude.decorators import serialize, csrf_protection
from certidude import const, config, authority
from .utils import AuthorityHandler
from .utils.firewall import login_required, authorize_admin
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class CertificateAuthorityResource(object):
def on_get(self, req, resp):
logger.info("Served CA certificate to %s", req.context.get("remote_addr"))
resp.stream = open(config.AUTHORITY_CERTIFICATE_PATH, "rb")
resp.append_header("Content-Type", "application/x-x509-ca-cert")
resp.append_header("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=%s.crt" %
const.HOSTNAME.encode("ascii"))
class SessionResource(AuthorityHandler):
@csrf_protection
@serialize
@login_required
@authorize_admin
def on_get(self, req, resp):
def serialize_requests(g):
for common_name, path, buf, req, submitted, server in g():
try:
submission_address = getxattr(path, "user.request.address").decode("ascii") # TODO: move to authority.py
except IOError:
submission_address = None
try:
submission_hostname = getxattr(path, "user.request.hostname").decode("ascii") # TODO: move to authority.py
except IOError:
submission_hostname = None
yield dict(
submitted = submitted,
common_name = common_name,
address = submission_address,
hostname = submission_hostname if submission_hostname != submission_address else None,
md5sum = hashlib.md5(buf).hexdigest(),
sha1sum = hashlib.sha1(buf).hexdigest(),
sha256sum = hashlib.sha256(buf).hexdigest(),
sha512sum = hashlib.sha512(buf).hexdigest()
)
def serialize_revoked(g):
for common_name, path, buf, cert, signed, expired, revoked, reason in g(limit=5):
yield dict(
serial = "%x" % cert.serial_number,
common_name = common_name,
# TODO: key type, key length, key exponent, key modulo
signed = signed,
expired = expired,
revoked = revoked,
reason = reason,
sha256sum = hashlib.sha256(buf).hexdigest())
def serialize_certificates(g):
for common_name, path, buf, cert, signed, expires in g():
# Extract certificate tags from filesystem
try:
tags = []
for tag in getxattr(path, "user.xdg.tags").decode("utf-8").split(","):
if "=" in tag:
k, v = tag.split("=", 1)
else:
k, v = "other", tag
tags.append(dict(id=tag, key=k, value=v))
except IOError: # No such attribute(s)
tags = None
attributes = {}
for key in listxattr(path):
if key.startswith(b"user.machine."):
attributes[key[13:].decode("ascii")] = getxattr(path, key).decode("ascii")
# Extract lease information from filesystem
try:
last_seen = datetime.strptime(getxattr(path, "user.lease.last_seen").decode("ascii"), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.%fZ")
lease = dict(
inner_address = getxattr(path, "user.lease.inner_address").decode("ascii"),
outer_address = getxattr(path, "user.lease.outer_address").decode("ascii"),
last_seen = last_seen,
age = datetime.utcnow() - last_seen
)
except IOError: # No such attribute(s)
lease = None
try:
signer_username = getxattr(path, "user.signature.username").decode("ascii")
except IOError:
signer_username = None
# TODO: dedup
yield dict(
serial = "%x" % cert.serial_number,
organizational_unit = cert.subject.native.get("organizational_unit_name"),
common_name = common_name,
# TODO: key type, key length, key exponent, key modulo
signed = signed,
expires = expires,
sha256sum = hashlib.sha256(buf).hexdigest(),
signer = signer_username,
lease = lease,
tags = tags,
attributes = attributes or None,
extensions = dict([
(e["extn_id"].native, e["extn_value"].native)
for e in cert["tbs_certificate"]["extensions"]
if e["extn_id"].native in ("extended_key_usage",)])
)
logger.info("Logged in authority administrator %s from %s" % (req.context.get("user"), req.context.get("remote_addr")))
return dict(
user = dict(
name=req.context.get("user").name,
gn=req.context.get("user").given_name,
sn=req.context.get("user").surname,
mail=req.context.get("user").mail
),
request_submission_allowed = config.REQUEST_SUBMISSION_ALLOWED,
service = dict(
protocols = config.SERVICE_PROTOCOLS,
routers = [j[0] for j in authority.list_signed(
common_name=config.SERVICE_ROUTERS)]
),
authority = dict(
builder = dict(
profiles = config.IMAGE_BUILDER_PROFILES
),
tagging = [dict(name=t[0], type=t[1], title=t[2]) for t in config.TAG_TYPES],
lease = dict(
offline = 600, # Seconds from last seen activity to consider lease offline, OpenVPN reneg-sec option
dead = 604800 # Seconds from last activity to consider lease dead, X509 chain broken or machine discarded
),
certificate = dict(
algorithm = authority.public_key.algorithm,
common_name = self.authority.certificate.subject.native["common_name"],
distinguished_name = cert_to_dn(self.authority.certificate),
md5sum = hashlib.md5(self.authority.certificate_buf).hexdigest(),
blob = self.authority.certificate_buf.decode("ascii"),
),
mailer = dict(
name = config.MAILER_NAME,
address = config.MAILER_ADDRESS
) if config.MAILER_ADDRESS else None,
machine_enrollment_subnets=config.MACHINE_ENROLLMENT_SUBNETS,
user_enrollment_allowed=config.USER_ENROLLMENT_ALLOWED,
user_multiple_certificates=config.USER_MULTIPLE_CERTIFICATES,
events = config.EVENT_SOURCE_SUBSCRIBE % config.EVENT_SOURCE_TOKEN,
requests=serialize_requests(self.authority.list_requests),
signed=serialize_certificates(self.authority.list_signed),
revoked=serialize_revoked(self.authority.list_revoked),
admin_users = User.objects.filter_admins(),
user_subnets = config.USER_SUBNETS or None,
autosign_subnets = config.AUTOSIGN_SUBNETS or None,
request_subnets = config.REQUEST_SUBNETS or None,
admin_subnets=config.ADMIN_SUBNETS or None,
signature = dict(
revocation_list_lifetime=config.REVOCATION_LIST_LIFETIME,
profiles = sorted([p.serialize() for p in config.PROFILES.values()], key=lambda p:p.get("slug")),
)
),
features=dict(
ocsp=bool(config.OCSP_SUBNETS),
crl=bool(config.CRL_SUBNETS),
token=bool(config.TOKEN_URL),
tagging=True,
leases=True,
logging=config.LOGGING_BACKEND)
)
class StaticResource(object):
def __init__(self, root):
self.root = os.path.realpath(root)
def __call__(self, req, resp):
path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(self.root, req.path[1:]))
if not path.startswith(self.root):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest()
if os.path.isdir(path):
path = os.path.join(path, "index.html")
if os.path.exists(path):
content_type, content_encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(path)
if content_type:
resp.append_header("Content-Type", content_type)
if content_encoding:
resp.append_header("Content-Encoding", content_encoding)
resp.stream = open(path, "rb")
logger.debug("Serving '%s' from '%s'", req.path, path)
else:
resp.status = falcon.HTTP_404
resp.body = "File '%s' not found" % req.path
logger.info("File '%s' not found, path resolved to '%s'", req.path, path)
import ipaddress
import os
from certidude import config
from user_agents import parse
class NormalizeMiddleware(object):
def process_request(self, req, resp, *args):
assert not req.get_param("unicode") or req.get_param("unicode") == u"", "Unicode sanity check failed"
req.context["remote_addr"] = ipaddress.ip_address(req.access_route[0])
if req.user_agent:
req.context["user_agent"] = parse(req.user_agent)
else:
req.context["user_agent"] = "Unknown user agent"
def certidude_app(log_handlers=[]):
from certidude import authority, config
@@ -225,10 +26,10 @@ def certidude_app(log_handlers=[]):
from .bootstrap import BootstrapResource
from .token import TokenResource
from .builder import ImageBuilderResource
from .session import SessionResource, CertificateAuthorityResource
app = falcon.API(middleware=NormalizeMiddleware())
app.req_options.auto_parse_form_urlencoded = True
#app.req_options.strip_url_path_trailing_slash = False
# Certificate authority API calls
app.add_route("/api/certificate/", CertificateAuthorityResource())
@@ -270,9 +71,6 @@ def certidude_app(log_handlers=[]):
from .scep import SCEPResource
app.add_route("/api/scep/", SCEPResource(authority))
# Add sink for serving static files
app.add_sink(StaticResource(os.path.join(__file__, "..", "..", "static")))
if config.OCSP_SUBNETS:
from .ocsp import OCSPResource
app.add_sink(OCSPResource(authority), prefix="/api/ocsp")

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import falcon
import logging
import re
from xattr import setxattr, listxattr, removexattr
from xattr import setxattr, listxattr, removexattr, getxattr
from certidude import push
from certidude.decorators import serialize, csrf_protection
from .utils.firewall import login_required, authorize_admin, whitelist_subject
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ class AttributeResource(object):
Return extended attributes stored on the server.
This not only contains tags and lease information,
but might also contain some other sensitive information.
Results made available only to lease IP address.
"""
try:
path, buf, cert, attribs = self.authority.get_attributes(cn,
@@ -44,14 +43,22 @@ class AttributeResource(object):
if not re.match("[a-z0-9_\.]+$", key):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Invalid key %s" % key)
valid = set()
modified = False
for key, value in req.params.items():
identifier = ("user.%s.%s" % (self.namespace, key)).encode("ascii")
try:
if getxattr(path, identifier).decode("utf-8") != value:
modified = True
except OSError: # no such attribute
pass
setxattr(path, identifier, value.encode("utf-8"))
valid.add(identifier)
for key in listxattr(path):
if not key.startswith(namespace):
continue
if key not in valid:
modified = True
removexattr(path, key)
push.publish("attribute-update", cn)
if modified:
push.publish("attribute-update", cn)

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@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ class LeaseResource(AuthorityHandler):
@authorize_server
def on_post(self, req, resp):
client_common_name = req.get_param("client", required=True)
m = re.match("CN=(.+?),", client_common_name) # It's actually DN, resolve it to CN
m = re.match("^(.*, )*CN=(.+?)(, .*)*$", client_common_name) # It's actually DN, resolve it to CN
if m:
client_common_name, = m.groups()
_, client_common_name, _ = m.groups()
path, buf, cert, signed, expires = self.authority.get_signed(client_common_name) # TODO: catch exceptions
if req.get_param("serial") and cert.serial_number != req.get_param_as_int("serial"): # OCSP-ish solution for OpenVPN, not exposed for StrongSwan

View File

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ class RequestListResource(AuthorityHandler):
resp.set_header("Content-Type", "application/x-pem-file")
_, resp.body = self.authority._sign(csr, body,
overwrite=overwrite_allowed, profile=config.PROFILES["rw"])
logger.info("Autosigned %s as %s is whitelisted", common_name, req.context.get("remote_addr"))
logger.info("Signed %s as %s is whitelisted for autosign", common_name, req.context.get("remote_addr"))
return
except EnvironmentError:
logger.info("Autosign for %s from %s failed, signed certificate already exists",
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ class RequestListResource(AuthorityHandler):
reasons.append("autosign failed, signed certificate already exists")
break
else:
reasons.append("autosign failed, IP address not whitelisted")
reasons.append("IP address not whitelisted for autosign")
else:
reasons.append("autosign not requested")
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ class RequestListResource(AuthorityHandler):
push.publish("request-submitted", common_name)
# Wait the certificate to be signed if waiting is requested
logger.info("Stored signing request %s from %s, reasons: %s", common_name, req.context.get("remote_addr"), reasons)
logger.info("Signing request %s from %s put on hold, %s", common_name, req.context.get("remote_addr"), ", ".join(reasons))
if req.get_param("wait"):
# Redirect to nginx pub/sub
@@ -178,7 +178,6 @@ class RequestListResource(AuthorityHandler):
click.echo("Redirecting to: %s" % url)
resp.status = falcon.HTTP_SEE_OTHER
resp.set_header("Location", url)
logger.debug("Redirecting signing request from %s to %s, reasons: %s", req.context.get("remote_addr"), url, ", ".join(reasons))
else:
# Request was accepted, but not processed
resp.status = falcon.HTTP_202
@@ -256,7 +255,7 @@ class RequestDetailResource(AuthorityHandler):
@authorize_admin
def on_delete(self, req, resp, cn):
try:
self.authority.delete_request(cn)
self.authority.delete_request(cn, user=req.context.get("user"))
# Logging implemented in the function above
except errors.RequestDoesNotExist as e:
resp.body = "No certificate signing request for %s found" % cn

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@@ -20,19 +20,12 @@ class RevocationListResource(AuthorityHandler):
logger.debug("Serving revocation list (DER) to %s", req.context.get("remote_addr"))
resp.body = self.authority.export_crl(pem=False)
elif req.client_accepts("application/x-pem-file"):
if req.get_param_as_bool("wait"):
url = config.LONG_POLL_SUBSCRIBE % "crl"
resp.status = falcon.HTTP_SEE_OTHER
resp.set_header("Location", url)
logger.debug("Redirecting to CRL request to %s", url)
resp.body = "Redirecting to %s" % url
else:
resp.set_header("Content-Type", "application/x-pem-file")
resp.append_header(
"Content-Disposition",
("attachment; filename=%s-crl.pem" % const.HOSTNAME))
logger.debug("Serving revocation list (PEM) to %s", req.context.get("remote_addr"))
resp.body = self.authority.export_crl()
resp.set_header("Content-Type", "application/x-pem-file")
resp.append_header(
"Content-Disposition",
("attachment; filename=%s-crl.pem" % const.HOSTNAME))
logger.debug("Serving revocation list (PEM) to %s", req.context.get("remote_addr"))
resp.body = self.authority.export_crl()
else:
logger.debug("Client %s asked revocation list in unsupported format" % req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnsupportedMediaType(

178
certidude/api/session.py Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
from datetime import datetime
from xattr import listxattr, getxattr
import falcon
import hashlib
import logging
from certidude import const, config
from certidude.common import cert_to_dn
from certidude.decorators import serialize, csrf_protection
from certidude.user import User
from .utils import AuthorityHandler
from .utils.firewall import login_required, authorize_admin
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class CertificateAuthorityResource(object):
def on_get(self, req, resp):
logger.info("Served CA certificate to %s", req.context.get("remote_addr"))
resp.stream = open(config.AUTHORITY_CERTIFICATE_PATH, "rb")
resp.append_header("Content-Type", "application/x-x509-ca-cert")
resp.append_header("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=%s.crt" %
const.HOSTNAME.encode("ascii"))
class SessionResource(AuthorityHandler):
@csrf_protection
@serialize
@login_required
@authorize_admin
def on_get(self, req, resp):
def serialize_requests(g):
for common_name, path, buf, req, submitted, server in g():
try:
submission_address = getxattr(path, "user.request.address").decode("ascii") # TODO: move to authority.py
except IOError:
submission_address = None
try:
submission_hostname = getxattr(path, "user.request.hostname").decode("ascii") # TODO: move to authority.py
except IOError:
submission_hostname = None
yield dict(
submitted = submitted,
common_name = common_name,
address = submission_address,
hostname = submission_hostname if submission_hostname != submission_address else None,
md5sum = hashlib.md5(buf).hexdigest(),
sha1sum = hashlib.sha1(buf).hexdigest(),
sha256sum = hashlib.sha256(buf).hexdigest(),
sha512sum = hashlib.sha512(buf).hexdigest()
)
def serialize_revoked(g):
for common_name, path, buf, cert, signed, expired, revoked, reason in g(limit=5):
yield dict(
serial = "%x" % cert.serial_number,
common_name = common_name,
# TODO: key type, key length, key exponent, key modulo
signed = signed,
expired = expired,
revoked = revoked,
reason = reason,
sha256sum = hashlib.sha256(buf).hexdigest())
def serialize_certificates(g):
for common_name, path, buf, cert, signed, expires in g():
# Extract certificate tags from filesystem
try:
tags = []
for tag in getxattr(path, "user.xdg.tags").decode("utf-8").split(","):
if "=" in tag:
k, v = tag.split("=", 1)
else:
k, v = "other", tag
tags.append(dict(id=tag, key=k, value=v))
except IOError: # No such attribute(s)
tags = None
attributes = {}
for key in listxattr(path):
if key.startswith(b"user.machine."):
attributes[key[13:].decode("ascii")] = getxattr(path, key).decode("ascii")
# Extract lease information from filesystem
try:
last_seen = datetime.strptime(getxattr(path, "user.lease.last_seen").decode("ascii"), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.%fZ")
lease = dict(
inner_address = getxattr(path, "user.lease.inner_address").decode("ascii"),
outer_address = getxattr(path, "user.lease.outer_address").decode("ascii"),
last_seen = last_seen,
age = datetime.utcnow() - last_seen
)
except IOError: # No such attribute(s)
lease = None
try:
signer_username = getxattr(path, "user.signature.username").decode("ascii")
except IOError:
signer_username = None
# TODO: dedup
yield dict(
serial = "%x" % cert.serial_number,
organizational_unit = cert.subject.native.get("organizational_unit_name"),
common_name = common_name,
# TODO: key type, key length, key exponent, key modulo
signed = signed,
expires = expires,
sha256sum = hashlib.sha256(buf).hexdigest(),
signer = signer_username,
lease = lease,
tags = tags,
attributes = attributes or None,
extensions = dict([
(e["extn_id"].native, e["extn_value"].native)
for e in cert["tbs_certificate"]["extensions"]
if e["extn_id"].native in ("extended_key_usage",)])
)
logger.info("Logged in authority administrator %s from %s with %s" % (
req.context.get("user"), req.context.get("remote_addr"), req.context.get("user_agent")))
return dict(
user = dict(
name=req.context.get("user").name,
gn=req.context.get("user").given_name,
sn=req.context.get("user").surname,
mail=req.context.get("user").mail
),
request_submission_allowed = config.REQUEST_SUBMISSION_ALLOWED,
service = dict(
protocols = config.SERVICE_PROTOCOLS,
routers = [j[0] for j in self.authority.list_signed(
common_name=config.SERVICE_ROUTERS)]
),
authority = dict(
builder = dict(
profiles = config.IMAGE_BUILDER_PROFILES
),
tagging = [dict(name=t[0], type=t[1], title=t[2]) for t in config.TAG_TYPES],
lease = dict(
offline = 600, # Seconds from last seen activity to consider lease offline, OpenVPN reneg-sec option
dead = 604800 # Seconds from last activity to consider lease dead, X509 chain broken or machine discarded
),
certificate = dict(
algorithm = self.authority.public_key.algorithm,
common_name = self.authority.certificate.subject.native["common_name"],
distinguished_name = cert_to_dn(self.authority.certificate),
md5sum = hashlib.md5(self.authority.certificate_buf).hexdigest(),
blob = self.authority.certificate_buf.decode("ascii"),
),
mailer = dict(
name = config.MAILER_NAME,
address = config.MAILER_ADDRESS
) if config.MAILER_ADDRESS else None,
machine_enrollment_subnets=config.MACHINE_ENROLLMENT_SUBNETS,
user_enrollment_allowed=config.USER_ENROLLMENT_ALLOWED,
user_multiple_certificates=config.USER_MULTIPLE_CERTIFICATES,
events = config.EVENT_SOURCE_SUBSCRIBE % config.EVENT_SOURCE_TOKEN,
requests=serialize_requests(self.authority.list_requests),
signed=serialize_certificates(self.authority.list_signed),
revoked=serialize_revoked(self.authority.list_revoked),
admin_users = User.objects.filter_admins(),
user_subnets = config.USER_SUBNETS or None,
autosign_subnets = config.AUTOSIGN_SUBNETS or None,
request_subnets = config.REQUEST_SUBNETS or None,
admin_subnets=config.ADMIN_SUBNETS or None,
signature = dict(
revocation_list_lifetime=config.REVOCATION_LIST_LIFETIME,
profiles = sorted([p.serialize() for p in config.PROFILES.values()], key=lambda p:p.get("slug")),
)
),
features=dict(
ocsp=bool(config.OCSP_SUBNETS),
crl=bool(config.CRL_SUBNETS),
token=bool(config.TOKEN_URL),
tagging=True,
leases=True,
logging=config.LOGGING_BACKEND)
)

View File

@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ class SignedCertificateDetailResource(AuthorityHandler):
@login_required
@authorize_admin
def on_delete(self, req, resp, cn):
logger.info("Revoked certificate %s by %s from %s",
cn, req.context.get("user"), req.context.get("remote_addr"))
self.authority.revoke(cn,
reason=req.get_param("reason", default="key_compromise"))
reason=req.get_param("reason", default="key_compromise"),
user=req.context.get("user")
)

View File

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ class TagResource(AuthorityHandler):
else:
tags.add("%s=%s" % (key,value))
setxattr(path, "user.xdg.tags", ",".join(tags).encode("utf-8"))
logger.debug("Tag %s=%s set for %s" % (key, value, cn))
logger.info("Tag %s=%s set for %s by %s" % (key, value, cn, req.context.get("user")))
push.publish("tag-update", cn)
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ class TagDetailResource(object):
else:
tags.add(value)
setxattr(path, "user.xdg.tags", ",".join(tags).encode("utf-8"))
logger.debug("Tag %s set to %s for %s" % (tag, value, cn))
logger.info("Tag %s set to %s for %s by %s" % (tag, value, cn, req.context.get("user")))
push.publish("tag-update", cn)
@csrf_protection
@@ -82,5 +82,5 @@ class TagDetailResource(object):
removexattr(path, "user.xdg.tags")
else:
setxattr(path, "user.xdg.tags", ",".join(tags))
logger.debug("Tag %s removed for %s" % (tag, cn))
logger.info("Tag %s removed for %s by %s" % (tag, cn, req.context.get("user")))
push.publish("tag-update", cn)

View File

@@ -4,15 +4,17 @@ import logging
import binascii
import click
import gssapi
import ldap
import os
import re
import simplepam
import socket
from asn1crypto import pem, x509
from base64 import b64decode
from certidude.user import User
from certidude import config, const
logger = logging.getLogger("api")
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def whitelist_subnets(subnets):
"""
@@ -81,158 +83,127 @@ def whitelist_subject(func):
def authenticate(optional=False):
def wrapper(func):
def kerberos_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs):
# Try pre-emptive authentication
if not req.auth:
if optional:
def wrapped(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs):
kerberized = False
if "kerberos" in config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS:
for subnet in config.KERBEROS_SUBNETS:
if req.context.get("remote_addr") in subnet:
kerberized = True
if not req.auth: # no credentials provided
if optional: # optional allowed
req.context["user"] = None
return func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
logger.debug("No Kerberos ticket offered while attempting to access %s from %s",
req.env["PATH_INFO"], req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Unauthorized",
"No Kerberos ticket offered, are you sure you've logged in with domain user account?",
["Negotiate"])
if kerberized:
logger.debug("No Kerberos ticket offered while attempting to access %s from %s",
req.env["PATH_INFO"], req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Unauthorized",
"No Kerberos ticket offered, are you sure you've logged in with domain user account?",
["Negotiate"])
else:
logger.debug("No credentials offered while attempting to access %s from %s",
req.env["PATH_INFO"], req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Unauthorized", "Please authenticate", ("Basic",))
os.environ["KRB5_KTNAME"] = config.KERBEROS_KEYTAB
if kerberized:
if not req.auth.startswith("Negotiate "):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request",
"Bad header, expected Negotiate: %s" % req.auth)
try:
server_creds = gssapi.creds.Credentials(
usage='accept',
name=gssapi.names.Name('HTTP/%s'% const.FQDN))
except gssapi.raw.exceptions.BadNameError:
logger.error("Failed initialize HTTP service principal, possibly bad permissions for %s or /etc/krb5.conf" %
config.KERBEROS_KEYTAB)
raise
os.environ["KRB5_KTNAME"] = config.KERBEROS_KEYTAB
context = gssapi.sec_contexts.SecurityContext(creds=server_creds)
try:
server_creds = gssapi.creds.Credentials(
usage='accept',
name=gssapi.names.Name('HTTP/%s'% const.FQDN))
except gssapi.raw.exceptions.BadNameError:
logger.error("Failed initialize HTTP service principal, possibly bad permissions for %s or /etc/krb5.conf" %
config.KERBEROS_KEYTAB)
raise
if not req.auth.startswith("Negotiate "):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Bad header, expected Negotiate: %s" % req.auth)
context = gssapi.sec_contexts.SecurityContext(creds=server_creds)
token = ''.join(req.auth.split()[1:])
token = ''.join(req.auth.split()[1:])
try:
context.step(b64decode(token))
except binascii.Error: # base64 errors
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Malformed token")
except gssapi.raw.exceptions.BadMechanismError:
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Unsupported authentication mechanism (NTLM?) was offered. Please make sure you've logged into the computer with domain user account. The web interface should not prompt for username or password.")
try:
context.step(b64decode(token))
except binascii.Error: # base64 errors
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Malformed token")
except gssapi.raw.exceptions.BadMechanismError:
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Unsupported authentication mechanism (NTLM?) was offered. Please make sure you've logged into the computer with domain user account. The web interface should not prompt for username or password.")
try:
username, realm = str(context.initiator_name).split("@")
except AttributeError: # TODO: Better exception
raise falcon.HTTPForbidden("Failed to determine username, are you trying to log in with correct domain account?")
try:
username, realm = str(context.initiator_name).split("@")
except AttributeError: # TODO: Better exception
raise falcon.HTTPForbidden("Failed to determine username, are you trying to log in with correct domain account?")
if realm != config.KERBEROS_REALM:
raise falcon.HTTPForbidden("Forbidden",
"Cross-realm trust not supported")
if realm != config.KERBEROS_REALM:
raise falcon.HTTPForbidden("Forbidden",
"Cross-realm trust not supported")
if username.endswith("$") and optional:
# Extract machine hostname
# TODO: Assert LDAP group membership
req.context["machine"] = username[:-1].lower()
req.context["user"] = None
else:
# Attempt to look up real user
req.context["user"] = User.objects.get(username)
if username.endswith("$") and optional:
# Extract machine hostname
# TODO: Assert LDAP group membership
req.context["machine"] = username[:-1].lower()
req.context["user"] = None
else:
# Attempt to look up real user
req.context["user"] = User.objects.get(username)
logger.debug("Succesfully authenticated user %s for %s from %s",
req.context["user"], req.env["PATH_INFO"], req.context["remote_addr"])
return func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
def ldap_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs):
"""
Authenticate against LDAP with WWW Basic Auth credentials
"""
if optional and not req.get_param_as_bool("authenticate"):
logger.debug("Succesfully authenticated user %s for %s from %s",
req.context["user"], req.env["PATH_INFO"], req.context["remote_addr"])
return func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
import ldap
else:
if not req.auth.startswith("Basic "):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Bad header, expected Basic: %s" % req.auth)
basic, token = req.auth.split(" ", 1)
user, passwd = b64decode(token).decode("ascii").split(":", 1)
if not req.auth:
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Unauthorized",
"No authentication header provided",
("Basic",))
if config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS == {"pam"}:
if not simplepam.authenticate(user, passwd, "sshd"):
logger.critical("Basic authentication failed for user %s from %s, "
"are you sure server process has read access to /etc/shadow?",
repr(user), req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Forbidden", "Invalid password", ("Basic",))
conn = None
elif "ldap" in config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS:
upn = "%s@%s" % (user, config.KERBEROS_REALM)
click.echo("Connecting to %s as %s" % (config.LDAP_AUTHENTICATION_URI, upn))
conn = ldap.initialize(config.LDAP_AUTHENTICATION_URI, bytes_mode=False)
conn.set_option(ldap.OPT_REFERRALS, 0)
if not req.auth.startswith("Basic "):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Bad header, expected Basic: %s" % req.auth)
try:
conn.simple_bind_s(upn, passwd)
except ldap.STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED:
logger.critical("LDAP server demands encryption, use ldaps:// instead of ldaps://")
raise
except ldap.SERVER_DOWN:
logger.critical("Failed to connect LDAP server at %s, are you sure LDAP server's CA certificate has been copied to this machine?",
config.LDAP_AUTHENTICATION_URI)
raise
except ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS:
logger.critical("LDAP bind authentication failed for user %s from %s",
repr(user), req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Forbidden",
"Please authenticate with %s domain account username" % const.DOMAIN,
("Basic",))
from base64 import b64decode
basic, token = req.auth.split(" ", 1)
user, passwd = b64decode(token).decode("ascii").split(":", 1)
upn = "%s@%s" % (user, const.DOMAIN)
click.echo("Connecting to %s as %s" % (config.LDAP_AUTHENTICATION_URI, upn))
conn = ldap.initialize(config.LDAP_AUTHENTICATION_URI, bytes_mode=False)
conn.set_option(ldap.OPT_REFERRALS, 0)
req.context["ldap_conn"] = conn
else:
raise NotImplementedError("No suitable authentication method configured")
try:
conn.simple_bind_s(upn, passwd)
except ldap.STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED:
logger.critical("LDAP server demands encryption, use ldaps:// instead of ldaps://")
raise
except ldap.SERVER_DOWN:
logger.critical("Failed to connect LDAP server at %s, are you sure LDAP server's CA certificate has been copied to this machine?",
config.LDAP_AUTHENTICATION_URI)
raise
except ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS:
logger.critical("LDAP bind authentication failed for user %s from %s",
repr(user), req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Forbidden",
"Please authenticate with %s domain account username" % const.DOMAIN,
("Basic",))
req.context["user"] = User.objects.get(user)
except User.DoesNotExist:
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Unauthorized", "Invalid credentials", ("Basic",))
req.context["ldap_conn"] = conn
req.context["user"] = User.objects.get(user)
retval = func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
conn.unbind_s()
if conn:
conn.unbind_s()
return retval
def pam_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs):
"""
Authenticate against PAM with WWW Basic Auth credentials
"""
if optional and not req.get_param_as_bool("authenticate"):
return func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
if not req.auth:
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Forbidden", "Please authenticate", ("Basic",))
if not req.auth.startswith("Basic "):
raise falcon.HTTPBadRequest("Bad request", "Bad header: %s" % req.auth)
basic, token = req.auth.split(" ", 1)
user, passwd = b64decode(token).decode("ascii").split(":", 1)
import simplepam
if not simplepam.authenticate(user, passwd, "sshd"):
logger.critical("Basic authentication failed for user %s from %s, "
"are you sure server process has read access to /etc/shadow?",
repr(user), req.context.get("remote_addr"))
raise falcon.HTTPUnauthorized("Forbidden", "Invalid password", ("Basic",))
req.context["user"] = User.objects.get(user)
return func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
def wrapped(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs):
# If LDAP enabled and device is not Kerberos capable fall
# back to LDAP bind authentication
if "ldap" in config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS:
if "Android" in req.user_agent or "iPhone" in req.user_agent:
return ldap_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
if "kerberos" in config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS:
return kerberos_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
elif config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS == {"pam"}:
return pam_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
elif config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS == {"ldap"}:
return ldap_authenticate(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
else:
raise NotImplementedError("Authentication backend %s not supported" % config.AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS)
return wrapped
return wrapper
@@ -247,7 +218,6 @@ def authorize_admin(func):
@whitelist_subnets(config.ADMIN_SUBNETS)
def wrapped(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs):
if req.context.get("user").is_admin():
req.context["admin_authorized"] = True
return func(resource, req, resp, *args, **kwargs)
logger.info("User '%s' not authorized to access administrative API", req.context.get("user").name)
raise falcon.HTTPForbidden("Forbidden", "User not authorized to perform administrative operations")