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https://github.com/laurivosandi/certidude
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Add AKID and SKID
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@ -863,7 +863,15 @@ def certidude_setup_authority(parent, country, state, locality, organization, or
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crypto.X509Extension(
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b"subjectAltName",
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False,
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"DNS: %s, email: %s" % (common_name.encode("ascii"), email_address.encode("ascii")))
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(u"DNS: %s, email: %s" % (common_name, email_address)).encode("ascii"))
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])
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ca.add_extensions([
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crypto.X509Extension(
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b"authorityKeyIdentifier",
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False,
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b"keyid:always",
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issuer = ca)
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])
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if ocsp_responder_url:
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@ -7,25 +7,21 @@ import os
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import asyncore
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import asynchat
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from certidude import constants, config
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from datetime import datetime
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from OpenSSL import crypto
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"""
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Signer processes are spawned per private key.
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Private key should only be readable by root.
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Signer process starts up as root, reads private key,
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drops privileges and awaits for opcodes (sign-request, export-crl) at UNIX domain socket
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under /run/certidude/signer/
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The main motivation behind the concept is to mitigate private key leaks
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by confining it to a separate process.
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from cryptography import x509
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from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta
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from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID, ExtendedKeyUsageOID
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import random
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Note that signer process uses basicConstraints, keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage
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attributes from openssl.cnf via CertificateAuthority wrapper class.
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Hence it's possible only to sign such certificates via the signer process,
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making it hard to take advantage of hacked Certidude server, eg. being able to sign
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certificate authoirty (basicConstraints=CA:TRUE) or
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TLS server certificates (extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth).
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"""
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DN_WHITELIST = NameOID.COMMON_NAME, NameOID.GIVEN_NAME, NameOID.SURNAME, \
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NameOID.EMAIL_ADDRESS
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SERIAL_MIN = 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000
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SERIAL_MAX = 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
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def raw_sign(private_key, ca_cert, request, basic_constraints, lifetime, key_usage=None, extended_key_usage=None):
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"""
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@ -42,15 +38,20 @@ def raw_sign(private_key, ca_cert, request, basic_constraints, lifetime, key_usa
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# Set issuer
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cert.set_issuer(ca_cert.get_subject())
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# Copy attributes from CA
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if ca_cert.get_subject().C:
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cert.get_subject().C = ca_cert.get_subject().C
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if ca_cert.get_subject().ST:
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cert.get_subject().ST = ca_cert.get_subject().ST
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if ca_cert.get_subject().L:
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cert.get_subject().L = ca_cert.get_subject().L
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if ca_cert.get_subject().O:
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cert.get_subject().O = ca_cert.get_subject().O
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# Set SKID and AKID extensions
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cert.add_extensions([
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crypto.X509Extension(
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b"subjectKeyIdentifier",
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False,
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b"hash",
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subject = cert),
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crypto.X509Extension(
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b"authorityKeyIdentifier",
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False,
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b"keyid:always",
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issuer = ca_cert)
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])
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# Copy attributes from request
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cert.get_subject().CN = request.get_subject().CN
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@ -98,10 +99,8 @@ def raw_sign(private_key, ca_cert, request, basic_constraints, lifetime, key_usa
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cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(-3600)
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cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(lifetime * 24 * 60 * 60)
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# Generate serial from 0x10000000000000000000 to 0xffffffffffffffffffff
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cert.set_serial_number(random.randint(
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0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000,
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0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff))
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# Generate random serial
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cert.set_serial_number(random.randint(SERIAL_MIN, SERIAL_MAX))
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cert.sign(private_key, 'sha256')
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return cert
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@ -114,57 +113,82 @@ class SignHandler(asynchat.async_chat):
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self.server = server
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def parse_command(self, cmd, body=""):
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now = datetime.utcnow()
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if cmd == "export-crl":
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"""
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Generate CRL object based on certificate serial number and revocation timestamp
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"""
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crl = crypto.CRL()
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builder = x509.CertificateRevocationListBuilder(
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).last_update(now
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).next_update(now + timedelta(days=1)
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).issuer_name(self.server.certificate.issuer
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).add_extension(
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x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(
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self.server.certificate.public_key()), False)
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if body:
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for line in body.split("\n"):
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serial_number, timestamp = line.split(":")
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# TODO: Assert serial against regex
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revocation = crypto.Revoked()
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revocation.set_rev_date(datetime.utcfromtimestamp(int(timestamp)).strftime("%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ").encode("ascii"))
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revocation.set_reason(b"keyCompromise")
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revocation.set_serial(serial_number.encode("ascii"))
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crl.add_revoked(revocation)
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revocation = x509.RevokedCertificateBuilder(
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).serial_number(int(serial_number, 16)
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).revocation_date(datetime.utcfromtimestamp(int(timestamp))
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).add_extension(x509.CRLReason(x509.ReasonFlags.key_compromise), False
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).build(default_backend())
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builder = builder.add_revoked_certificate(revocation)
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self.send(crl.export(
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self.server.certificate,
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crl = builder.sign(
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self.server.private_key,
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crypto.FILETYPE_PEM,
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config.REVOCATION_LIST_LIFETIME))
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hashes.SHA512(),
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default_backend())
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self.send(crl.public_bytes(Encoding.PEM))
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elif cmd == "ocsp-request":
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NotImplemented # TODO: Implement OCSP
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elif cmd == "sign-request":
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request = crypto.load_certificate_request(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, body)
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request = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(body, default_backend())
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subject = x509.Name([n for n in request.subject if n.oid in DN_WHITELIST])
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for e in request.get_extensions():
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key = e.get_short_name().decode("ascii")
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if key not in constants.EXTENSION_WHITELIST:
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raise ValueError("Certificte Signing Request contains extension '%s' which is not whitelisted" % key)
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cert = x509.CertificateBuilder(
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).subject_name(subject
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).serial_number(random.randint(SERIAL_MIN, SERIAL_MAX)
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).issuer_name(self.server.certificate.issuer
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).public_key(request.public_key()
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).not_valid_before(now - timedelta(hours=1)
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).not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=config.CERTIFICATE_LIFETIME)
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).add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), critical=True,
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).add_extension(x509.KeyUsage(
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digital_signature=True,
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key_encipherment=True,
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content_commitment=False,
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data_encipherment=False,
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key_agreement=False,
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key_cert_sign=False,
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crl_sign=False,
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encipher_only=False,
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decipher_only=False), critical=True,
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).add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage(
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[ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CLIENT_AUTH]
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), critical=True,
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).add_extension(
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x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(request.public_key()),
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critical=False
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).add_extension(
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x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(
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self.server.certificate.public_key()),
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critical=False
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).sign(self.server.private_key, hashes.SHA512(), default_backend())
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# TODO: Potential exploits during PEM parsing?
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cert = raw_sign(
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self.server.private_key,
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self.server.certificate,
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request,
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basic_constraints=config.CERTIFICATE_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
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key_usage=config.CERTIFICATE_KEY_USAGE_FLAGS,
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extended_key_usage=config.CERTIFICATE_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_FLAGS,
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lifetime=config.CERTIFICATE_LIFETIME)
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self.send(crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, cert))
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self.send(cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM))
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else:
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raise NotImplementedError("Unknown command: %s" % cmd)
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self.close_when_done()
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def found_terminator(self):
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args = (b"".join(self.buffer)).decode("ascii").split("\n", 1)
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args = (b"".join(self.buffer)).split("\n", 1)
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self.parse_command(*args)
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self.buffer = []
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@ -184,20 +208,17 @@ class SignServer(asyncore.dispatcher):
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self.bind(config.SIGNER_SOCKET_PATH)
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self.listen(5)
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# Load CA private key and certificate
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self.private_key = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM,
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open(config.AUTHORITY_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH).read())
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self.certificate = crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM,
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open(config.AUTHORITY_CERTIFICATE_PATH).read())
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self.private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
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open(config.AUTHORITY_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH).read(),
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password=None, # TODO: Ask password for private key?
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backend=default_backend())
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self.certificate = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(
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open(config.AUTHORITY_CERTIFICATE_PATH).read(),
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backend=default_backend())
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# Perhaps perform chroot as well, currently results in
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# (<class 'OpenSSL.crypto.Error'>:[('random number generator', 'SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES', 'PRNG not seeded')
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# probably needs partially populated /dev in chroot
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# Dropping privileges
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# Drop privileges
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_, _, uid, gid, gecos, root, shell = pwd.getpwnam("nobody")
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#os.chroot("/run/certidude/signer/jail")
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os.setgid(gid)
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os.setuid(uid)
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