diff --git a/server/handlers.go b/server/handlers.go
index d982f0be..11dcdd07 100755
--- a/server/handlers.go
+++ b/server/handlers.go
@@ -502,6 +502,8 @@ func (s *Server) finalizeLogin(identity connector.Identity, authReq storage.Auth
 
 	// TODO: if s.skipApproval or !authReq.ForceApprovalPrompt, we can skip the redirect to /approval and go ahead and send code
 
+	// an HMAC is used here to ensure that the request ID is unpredictable, ensuring that an attacker who intercepted the original
+	// flow would be unable to poll for the result at the /approval endpoint
 	h := hmac.New(sha256.New, authReq.HMACKey)
 	h.Write([]byte(authReq.ID))
 	mac := h.Sum(nil)
@@ -576,7 +578,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleApproval(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	// build expected hmac with secret key
 	h := hmac.New(sha256.New, authReq.HMACKey)
-	h.Write([]byte(r.FormValue("req")))
+	h.Write([]byte(authReq.ID))
 	expectedMAC := h.Sum(nil)
 	// constant time comparison
 	if !hmac.Equal(mac, expectedMAC) {
diff --git a/storage/sql/crud.go b/storage/sql/crud.go
index 8ac4204f..1583c177 100644
--- a/storage/sql/crud.go
+++ b/storage/sql/crud.go
@@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ func (c *conn) CreateAuthRequest(a storage.AuthRequest) error {
 		a.Claims.Email, a.Claims.EmailVerified, encoder(a.Claims.Groups),
 		a.ConnectorID, a.ConnectorData,
 		a.Expiry,
-		a.PKCE.CodeChallenge, a.PKCE.CodeChallengeMethod, a.HMACKey,
+		a.PKCE.CodeChallenge, a.PKCE.CodeChallengeMethod,
+		a.HMACKey,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		if c.alreadyExistsCheck(err) {