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dex/connector/saml/saml.go

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// Package saml contains login methods for SAML.
package saml
import (
"bytes"
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"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"encoding/xml"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/beevik/etree"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/connector"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/pkg/log"
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dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
"github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig/etreeutils"
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)
const (
bindingRedirect = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect"
bindingPOST = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
nameIDFormatEmailAddress = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress"
nameIDFormatUnspecified = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified"
nameIDFormatX509Subject = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName"
nameIDFormatWindowsDN = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:WindowsDomainQualifiedName"
nameIDFormatEncrypted = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:encrypted"
nameIDFormatEntity = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity"
nameIDFormatKerberos = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:kerberos"
nameIDFormatPersistent = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent"
nameIDformatTransient = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient"
// top level status codes
statusCodeSuccess = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"
// subject confirmation methods
subjectConfirmationMethodBearer = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"
// allowed clock drift for timestamp validation
allowedClockDrift = time.Duration(30) * time.Second
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)
var (
nameIDFormats = []string{
nameIDFormatEmailAddress,
nameIDFormatUnspecified,
nameIDFormatX509Subject,
nameIDFormatWindowsDN,
nameIDFormatEncrypted,
nameIDFormatEntity,
nameIDFormatKerberos,
nameIDFormatPersistent,
nameIDformatTransient,
}
nameIDFormatLookup = make(map[string]string)
)
func init() {
suffix := func(s, sep string) string {
if i := strings.LastIndex(s, sep); i > 0 {
return s[i+1:]
}
return s
}
for _, format := range nameIDFormats {
nameIDFormatLookup[suffix(format, ":")] = format
nameIDFormatLookup[format] = format
}
}
// Config represents configuration options for the SAML provider.
type Config struct {
// TODO(ericchiang): A bunch of these fields could be auto-filled if
// we supported SAML metadata discovery.
//
// https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/35391/sstc-saml-metadata-errata-2.0-wd-04-diff.pdf
EntityIssuer string `json:"entityIssuer"`
SSOIssuer string `json:"ssoIssuer"`
SSOURL string `json:"ssoURL"`
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// X509 CA file or raw data to verify XML signatures.
CA string `json:"ca"`
CAData []byte `json:"caData"`
InsecureSkipSignatureValidation bool `json:"insecureSkipSignatureValidation"`
// Assertion attribute names to lookup various claims with.
UsernameAttr string `json:"usernameAttr"`
EmailAttr string `json:"emailAttr"`
GroupsAttr string `json:"groupsAttr"`
// If GroupsDelim is supplied the connector assumes groups are returned as a
// single string instead of multiple attribute values. This delimiter will be
// used split the groups string.
GroupsDelim string `json:"groupsDelim"`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirectURI"`
// Requested format of the NameID. The NameID value is is mapped to the ID Token
// 'sub' claim.
//
// This can be an abbreviated form of the full URI with just the last component. For
// example, if this value is set to "emailAddress" the format will resolve to:
//
// urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
//
// If no value is specified, this value defaults to:
//
// urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent
//
NameIDPolicyFormat string `json:"nameIDPolicyFormat"`
}
type certStore struct {
certs []*x509.Certificate
}
func (c certStore) Certificates() (roots []*x509.Certificate, err error) {
return c.certs, nil
}
// Open validates the config and returns a connector. It does not actually
// validate connectivity with the provider.
func (c *Config) Open(id string, logger log.Logger) (connector.Connector, error) {
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return c.openConnector(logger)
}
func (c *Config) openConnector(logger log.Logger) (*provider, error) {
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requiredFields := []struct {
name, val string
}{
{"ssoURL", c.SSOURL},
{"usernameAttr", c.UsernameAttr},
{"emailAttr", c.EmailAttr},
{"redirectURI", c.RedirectURI},
}
var missing []string
for _, f := range requiredFields {
if f.val == "" {
missing = append(missing, f.name)
}
}
switch len(missing) {
case 0:
case 1:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing required field %q", missing[0])
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing required fields %q", missing)
}
p := &provider{
entityIssuer: c.EntityIssuer,
ssoIssuer: c.SSOIssuer,
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ssoURL: c.SSOURL,
now: time.Now,
usernameAttr: c.UsernameAttr,
emailAttr: c.EmailAttr,
groupsAttr: c.GroupsAttr,
groupsDelim: c.GroupsDelim,
redirectURI: c.RedirectURI,
logger: logger,
nameIDPolicyFormat: c.NameIDPolicyFormat,
}
if p.nameIDPolicyFormat == "" {
p.nameIDPolicyFormat = nameIDFormatPersistent
} else {
if format, ok := nameIDFormatLookup[p.nameIDPolicyFormat]; ok {
p.nameIDPolicyFormat = format
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid nameIDPolicyFormat: %q", p.nameIDPolicyFormat)
}
}
if !c.InsecureSkipSignatureValidation {
if (c.CA == "") == (c.CAData == nil) {
return nil, errors.New("must provide either 'ca' or 'caData'")
}
var caData []byte
if c.CA != "" {
data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(c.CA)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read ca file: %v", err)
}
caData = data
} else {
caData = c.CAData
}
var (
certs []*x509.Certificate
block *pem.Block
)
for {
block, caData = pem.Decode(caData)
if block == nil {
caData = bytes.TrimSpace(caData)
if len(caData) > 0 { // if there's some left, we've been given bad caData
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse cert: trailing data: %q", string(caData))
}
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break
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse cert: %v", err)
}
certs = append(certs, cert)
}
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("no certificates found in ca data")
}
p.validator = dsig.NewDefaultValidationContext(certStore{certs})
}
return p, nil
}
type provider struct {
entityIssuer string
ssoIssuer string
ssoURL string
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now func() time.Time
// If nil, don't do signature validation.
validator *dsig.ValidationContext
// Attribute mappings
usernameAttr string
emailAttr string
groupsAttr string
groupsDelim string
redirectURI string
nameIDPolicyFormat string
logger log.Logger
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}
func (p *provider) POSTData(s connector.Scopes, id string) (action, value string, err error) {
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r := &authnRequest{
ProtocolBinding: bindingPOST,
ID: id,
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IssueInstant: xmlTime(p.now()),
Destination: p.ssoURL,
NameIDPolicy: &nameIDPolicy{
AllowCreate: true,
Format: p.nameIDPolicyFormat,
},
AssertionConsumerServiceURL: p.redirectURI,
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}
if p.entityIssuer != "" {
// Issuer for the request is optional. For example, okta always ignores
// this value.
r.Issuer = &issuer{Issuer: p.entityIssuer}
}
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data, err := xml.MarshalIndent(r, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("marshal authn request: %v", err)
}
// See: https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf
// "3.5.4 Message Encoding"
return p.ssoURL, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(data), nil
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}
// HandlePOST interprets a request from a SAML provider attempting to verify a
// user's identity.
//
// The steps taken are:
//
// * Verify signature on XML document (or verify sig on assertion elements).
// * Verify various parts of the Assertion element. Conditions, audience, etc.
// * Map the Assertion's attribute elements to user info.
//
func (p *provider) HandlePOST(s connector.Scopes, samlResponse, inResponseTo string) (ident connector.Identity, err error) {
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rawResp, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(samlResponse)
if err != nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("decode response: %v", err)
}
// Root element is allowed to not be signed if the Assertion element is.
rootElementSigned := true
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if p.validator != nil {
rawResp, rootElementSigned, err = verifyResponseSig(p.validator, rawResp)
if err != nil {
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return ident, fmt.Errorf("verify signature: %v", err)
}
}
var resp response
if err := xml.Unmarshal(rawResp, &resp); err != nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal response: %v", err)
}
// If the root element isn't signed, there's no reason to inspect these
// elements. They're not verified.
if rootElementSigned {
if p.ssoIssuer != "" && resp.Issuer != nil && resp.Issuer.Issuer != p.ssoIssuer {
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return ident, fmt.Errorf("expected Issuer value %s, got %s", p.ssoIssuer, resp.Issuer.Issuer)
}
// Verify InResponseTo value matches the expected ID associated with
// the RelayState.
if resp.InResponseTo != inResponseTo {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("expected InResponseTo value %s, got %s", inResponseTo, resp.InResponseTo)
}
// Destination is optional.
if resp.Destination != "" && resp.Destination != p.redirectURI {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("expected destination %q got %q", p.redirectURI, resp.Destination)
}
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// Status is a required element.
if resp.Status == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("Response did not contain a Status element")
}
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if err = p.validateStatus(resp.Status); err != nil {
return ident, err
}
}
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assertion := resp.Assertion
if assertion == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("response did not contain an assertion")
}
// Subject is usually optional, but we need it for the user ID, so complain
// if it's not present.
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subject := assertion.Subject
if subject == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a subject")
}
// Validate that the response is to the request we originally sent.
if err = p.validateSubject(subject, inResponseTo); err != nil {
return ident, err
}
// Conditions element is optional, but must be validated if present.
if assertion.Conditions != nil {
// Validate that dex is the intended audience of this response.
if err = p.validateConditions(assertion.Conditions); err != nil {
return ident, err
}
}
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switch {
case subject.NameID != nil:
if ident.UserID = subject.NameID.Value; ident.UserID == "" {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("NameID element does not contain a value")
}
default:
return ident, fmt.Errorf("subject does not contain an NameID element")
}
// After verifying the assertion, map data in the attribute statements to
// various user info.
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attributes := assertion.AttributeStatement
if attributes == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a AttributeStatement")
}
// Log the actual attributes we got back from the server. This helps debug
// configuration errors on the server side, where the SAML server doesn't
// send us the correct attributes.
p.logger.Infof("parsed and verified saml response attributes %s", attributes)
// Grab the email.
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if ident.Email, _ = attributes.get(p.emailAttr); ident.Email == "" {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.emailAttr, attributes.names())
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}
// TODO(ericchiang): Does SAML have an email_verified equivalent?
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ident.EmailVerified = true
// Grab the username.
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if ident.Username, _ = attributes.get(p.usernameAttr); ident.Username == "" {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.usernameAttr, attributes.names())
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}
if !s.Groups || p.groupsAttr == "" {
// Groups not requested or not configured. We're done.
return ident, nil
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}
// Grab the groups.
if p.groupsDelim != "" {
groupsStr, ok := attributes.get(p.groupsAttr)
if !ok {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.groupsAttr, attributes.names())
}
// TODO(ericchiang): Do we need to further trim whitespace?
ident.Groups = strings.Split(groupsStr, p.groupsDelim)
} else {
groups, ok := attributes.all(p.groupsAttr)
if !ok {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.groupsAttr, attributes.names())
}
ident.Groups = groups
}
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return ident, nil
}
// validateStatus verifies that the response has a good status code or
// formats a human readble error based on the bad status.
func (p *provider) validateStatus(status *status) error {
// StatusCode is mandatory in the Status type
statusCode := status.StatusCode
if statusCode == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a StatusCode")
}
if statusCode.Value != statusCodeSuccess {
parts := strings.Split(statusCode.Value, ":")
lastPart := parts[len(parts)-1]
errorMessage := fmt.Sprintf("status code of the Response was not Success, was %q", lastPart)
statusMessage := status.StatusMessage
if statusMessage != nil && statusMessage.Value != "" {
errorMessage += " -> " + statusMessage.Value
}
return fmt.Errorf(errorMessage)
}
return nil
}
// validateSubject ensures the response is to the request we expect.
//
// This is described in the spec "Profiles for the OASIS Security
// Assertion Markup Language" in section 3.3 Bearer.
// see https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/35389/sstc-saml-profiles-errata-2.0-wd-06-diff.pdf
//
// Some of these fields are optional, but we're going to be strict here since
// we have no other way of guarenteeing that this is actually the response to
// the request we expect.
func (p *provider) validateSubject(subject *subject, inResponseTo string) error {
// Optional according to the spec, but again, we're going to be strict here.
if len(subject.SubjectConfirmations) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("Subject contained no SubjectConfrimations")
}
var errs []error
// One of these must match our assumptions, not all.
for _, c := range subject.SubjectConfirmations {
err := func() error {
if c.Method != subjectConfirmationMethodBearer {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected subject confirmation method: %v", c.Method)
}
data := c.SubjectConfirmationData
if data == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("SubjectConfirmation contained no SubjectConfirmationData")
}
if data.InResponseTo != inResponseTo {
return fmt.Errorf("expected SubjectConfirmationData InResponseTo value %q, got %q", inResponseTo, data.InResponseTo)
}
notBefore := time.Time(data.NotBefore)
notOnOrAfter := time.Time(data.NotOnOrAfter)
now := p.now()
if !notBefore.IsZero() && before(now, notBefore) {
return fmt.Errorf("at %s got response that cannot be processed before %s", now, notBefore)
}
if !notOnOrAfter.IsZero() && after(now, notOnOrAfter) {
return fmt.Errorf("at %s got response that cannot be processed because it expired at %s", now, notOnOrAfter)
}
if r := data.Recipient; r != "" && r != p.redirectURI {
return fmt.Errorf("expected Recipient %q got %q", p.redirectURI, r)
}
return nil
}()
if err == nil {
// Subject is valid.
return nil
}
errs = append(errs, err)
}
if len(errs) == 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to validate subject confirmation: %v", errs[0])
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to validate subject confirmation: %v", errs)
}
// validationConditions ensures that dex is the intended audience
// for the request, and not another service provider.
//
// See: https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf
// "2.3.3 Element <Assertion>"
func (p *provider) validateConditions(conditions *conditions) error {
// Ensure the conditions haven't expired.
now := p.now()
notBefore := time.Time(conditions.NotBefore)
if !notBefore.IsZero() && before(now, notBefore) {
return fmt.Errorf("at %s got response that cannot be processed before %s", now, notBefore)
}
notOnOrAfter := time.Time(conditions.NotOnOrAfter)
if !notOnOrAfter.IsZero() && after(now, notOnOrAfter) {
return fmt.Errorf("at %s got response that cannot be processed because it expired at %s", now, notOnOrAfter)
}
// Sometimes, dex's issuer string can be different than the redirect URI,
// but if dex's issuer isn't explicitly provided assume the redirect URI.
expAud := p.entityIssuer
if expAud == "" {
expAud = p.redirectURI
}
// AudienceRestriction elements indicate the intended audience(s) of an
// assertion. If dex isn't in these audiences, reject the assertion.
//
// Note that if there are multiple AudienceRestriction elements, each must
// individually contain dex in their audience list.
for _, r := range conditions.AudienceRestriction {
values := make([]string, len(r.Audiences))
issuerInAudiences := false
for i, aud := range r.Audiences {
if aud.Value == expAud {
issuerInAudiences = true
break
}
values[i] = aud.Value
}
if !issuerInAudiences {
return fmt.Errorf("required audience %s was not in Response audiences %s", expAud, values)
}
}
return nil
}
// verifyResponseSig attempts to verify the signature of a SAML response or
// the assertion.
//
// If the root element is properly signed, this method returns it.
//
// The SAML spec requires supporting responses where the root element is
// unverified, but the sub <Assertion> elements are signed. In these cases,
// this method returns rootVerified=false to indicate that the <Assertion>
// elements should be trusted, but all other elements MUST be ignored.
//
// Note: we still don't support multiple <Assertion> tags. If there are
// multiple present this code will only process the first.
func verifyResponseSig(validator *dsig.ValidationContext, data []byte) (signed []byte, rootVerified bool, err error) {
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doc := etree.NewDocument()
if err = doc.ReadFromBytes(data); err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("parse document: %v", err)
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}
response := doc.Root()
transformedResponse, err := validator.Validate(response)
if err == nil {
// Root element is verified, return it.
doc.SetRoot(transformedResponse)
signed, err = doc.WriteToBytes()
return signed, true, err
}
// Ensures xmlns are copied down to the assertion element when they are defined in the root
//
// TODO: Only select from child elements of the root.
assertion, err := etreeutils.NSSelectOne(response, "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion", "Assertion")
if err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("response does not contain an Assertion element")
}
transformedAssertion, err := validator.Validate(assertion)
if err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("response does not contain a valid signature element: %v", err)
}
// Verified an assertion but not the response. Can't trust any child elements,
// except the assertion. Remove them all.
for _, el := range response.ChildElements() {
response.RemoveChild(el)
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}
// We still return the full <Response> element, even though it's unverified
// because the <Assertion> element is not a valid XML document on its own.
// It still requires the root element to define things like namespaces.
response.AddChild(transformedAssertion)
signed, err = doc.WriteToBytes()
return signed, false, err
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}
// before determines if a given time is before the current time, with an
// allowed clock drift.
func before(now, notBefore time.Time) bool {
return now.Add(allowedClockDrift).Before(notBefore)
}
// after determines if a given time is after the current time, with an
// allowed clock drift.
func after(now, notOnOrAfter time.Time) bool {
return now.After(notOnOrAfter.Add(allowedClockDrift))
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}